ANNEX

IPCC'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter	Recommendations
Chapter 6	<u>Police Use of Force in Public Order Policing</u> (1) Develop scenario-based guidelines with support by legal advice, similar in concept to those recommended by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, to supplement the use of force guidelines now in existence in Police General Orders and Force Procedures Manual. (2) Include in all training upon development of these supplemental guidelines. Consideration should be given to whether the operational command structure in public order events (POEs) needs to be further formalised, and whether there should be an accreditation system to ensure that officers are up to date on protest and policing techniques. (3) Allied with the review of guidelines and operational command structure, ensure that clear guidelines are given to commanders at all levels of their accountability to ensure that those under their command do adhere to Force guidelines in the operational circumstances faced by them. (4) Ensure that the public understands the law on the use of force and how it is applied by the Police Force. The results of this review should be published and that the Police Force policies and procedures on the use of force, be part of continuing public education on the role played by the Police in maintaining law and order. (5) Consider to have own legal capability within the Police, either departmentally or by full-time secondment from the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. (6) Appoint an expert committee comprising medical and scientific experts to advise the Police Force that current and future stocks of tear gas come within acceptable toxicological limits for use in Hong Kong streets. (7) Review current practices and procedures for the use of tear gas in public order situations, specifying situations in which it should not be used, and if used, the conditions under which it may be used.

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Chapter 7	<u>Incident Day – Sunday 9 June 2019</u> (8) Review how best to ensure individual officers strictly follow the guidelines on the use of force, including revising the training regime for meeting situations similar to recent events. (9) Review the need for engaging media representatives to draw up a Code of Practice for meeting both Police and media interests in their respective duties to the community and for ensuring safety of all concerned. (10) Establish at the senior management level a procedure for monitoring and reviewing the progress of a procession in order to proactively decide whether, or not, to open further road(s) for a procession. In particular, the Police should review their counting methodology to facilitate making prompt decisions on which road(s) should be opened taking into sufficient account of the changes in the number of participants as the procession progresses and develops.
Chapter 8	<u>Incident Day – Wednesday 12 June 2019</u> (11) Review the use of tear gas during the CITIC Tower Incident, including assessment before and during its continuing use, the coordination among Headquarters Command and Control Centre and with frontline officers, the communication between the Police and the assembly organiser and participants, the accessibility of an escape route and the possibility of alternative tactics for future deployment. (12) When there is an ongoing assembly with Letter of No Objection, liaise with the assembly organiser to curtail the assembly when necessary. The Police should give sufficient time and instructions to the assembly organiser and participants to curtail the assembly and leave the assembly location via a viable escape route. (13) Deploy liaison officer(s) close to the assembly site to facilitate instant communication with the assembly organiser. (14) To minimise the possible risk during dispersal action, review how to enhance coordination among different teams if the Police consider it

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	necessary to use irritant agent devices and less-lethal weapons when and where an assembly is ongoing with a large number of participants. (15) Include in the internal guidelines what action frontline officers can take when a situation is declared as a "riot", how to differentiate rioters from non-rioters and what level of force and weapons to be used in a riot situation. (16) Devise clear guidelines on riots and consider informing the public of the purpose, criteria and procedure of declaring a situation as a riot. When making a public announcement about a situation being a riot, the Police should clearly explain the purpose and reason for the declaration to minimise misunderstanding or speculation. This enhances transparency and prevents members of the public from participating in a riot unknowingly. (17) Review the ability to collect, assess and apply the intelligence received since 9 June on the early and large turnout of protesters as well as their violent approach, and draw reference to enhance the ability to collect, assess and apply intelligence in the future. (18) Review the events of 12 June and consider whether the preparation and subsequent action for defending Central Government Complex and Legislative Council (LegCo) Complex could have been adjusted to minimise confrontation with protesters and should review whether less confrontational strategies such as prior containment could be adopted in future operations for protecting public property such as LegCo Complex. (19) Review the ability to mobilise and allocate manpower to deal with multiple clashes at different spots in a large-scale POE. (20) Better utilise water-filled barriers (about 2 metres high) which are higher and stronger than mills barriers to reinforce police cordon lines and minimise clashes between frontline Police officers and violent protesters.

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Chapter 9	<u>Incident Day – Monday 1 July 2019</u> (21) Review the Police ability to mobilise and allocate manpower to deal with several major POEs simultaneously. (22) Review the Police ability for timely assessment (including ability to collect intelligence) and identification of potentially risky targets including those of symbolic or strategic importance to the HKSAR in the light of possible escalation of violent protests. (23) Review the Police ability to assess risk (including identification and evaluation of potential vulnerability) and identify risk mitigation of each major potential target. (24) Review risk mitigation measures identified for each target at risk and regularly review in the light of changing circumstances. (25) Review the strategic effectiveness of setting up cordon lines inside the LegCo Complex as opposed to outside the Complex. (26) Review the general tactics to lessen confrontation, where protection of targets at risk are concerned.
Chapter 10	<u>Incident Day – Sunday 21 July 2019</u> (27) Review Police procedures, strategy and manpower deployment when having to handle two or more major operations at the same time, particularly in the collection and collation of timely intelligence (including the monitoring of social and other media) for sharing and for better communications and coordination at all levels of the Porce command structure for more effective allocation ofresources on the ground in such situations. (28) Review the strategy and manpower deployment on the night of 21 July and in the early hours of 22 July for lessons to be learnt. (29) Review Force Media Relations Strategy to ensure timely and accurate information for the press on incidents and staff taking stand-up interviews

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	should be trained to project an image of care for public safety and impartiality in law enforcement, including reviewing and enhancing the training for senior officers in answering media questions at the scene, giving stand-up briefings, attending press interviews and press conferences. (30) Review Force Public and Community Relations Strategy in the light of the widespread use of the internet to turn Police action into allegations of misconduct in order to stir up resentment to drive further protest. (31) Review and rectify the deficiency in the Police 999 Console to cope with extreme stress such as that encountered on the night of 21 July to see what remedial measures are required. (32) Review localities likely to have continuing risks of confrontation such as those encountered in Yuen Long and prepare contingency plans for dealing with such confrontation, bearing in mind the issues encountered in Yuen Long on 21 July, the lessons learnt, and the recommendations above.
Chapter 11	<u>Incident Day – Sunday 11 August 2019</u> (33) Review the operational plans for occasion of POEs involving breach of peace and violent acts of protesters, in particular the strategies, gear and weapons for officers to quell disorder. (34) Enhance the provisions and guidelines on the use of tear gas in the urban populated setting of Hong Kong, in particular giving clear guidelines on the factors police officers should take into account when making assessment on the physical environment, degree of ventilation and the circumstances in considering the use of tear gas, making reference to international standards and manufacturers' rules. (35) Devise clear guidelines on the use of pepper ball launcher, including the suitable range and target area of the body, and take into consideration of manufacturers' safety guidelines and warnings on under what circumstances pepper ball launchers should or should not be used.

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	(36) Devise scenario-based practical training for officers on the use of tear gas, pepper ball launchers and other police weapons, including periodic accreditation of officers on the use of force in handling protests. (37) Devise scenario-based exercises in the training of officers on tactics to be used in handling POEs in different urban settings, in particular MTR stations and enclosed-areas with many people. (38) Delineate the role of command and frontline officers on their accountability in the use of force in different scenarios. (39) Devise means to enhance communications with the public on the intention to use force and related precautionary measures. (40) Strengthen and refine the relevant protocols, guidelines and training manuals for clearer advice to officers and the public.
Chapter 12	<u>Incident Day – Saturday 31 August 2019</u> (41) Review Police strategy on taking enforcement action that involve making a large number of individual arrests with the use of force. (42) Review Police strategy on taking enforcement action inside MTR stations or premises crowded with people. (43) Review the coordination among Police themselves and with other departments in major operations, especially where closure of entrances to a premises is involved, and devise procedures and clarify the chain of command to facilitate efficient communication and coordination work. (44) Devise means to enhance communications with the public about enforcement action that the Police has taken or is taking to increase transparency of Police work and to prevent unnecessary, unfounded or malicious speculations and rumours. In this regard, there should be more publicity and public education on Police procedures and practices for dealing with missing persons and death in Hong Kong.

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	(45) Given the increase in the use and popularity of social media, enhance the ability of the responsible teams in the Police to monitor the social media and devise procedures and protocols to deal with public concerns and untrue or malicious messages promptly and effectively by using the same media to propagate rebuttal. (46) Review how to facilitate the work of reporters in a major operation without causing undue hindrance to Police enforcement action. (47) Review the mechanism for the Police to disseminate information to the public to enhance transparency, for instance, Police Public Relations Branch to make timely announcement and update to the public on the situation inside Prince Edward Station to ease public concern and quash speculations or rumours. (48) Review the protocols for taking the lead to organise press conferences with other departments or institutions.
Chapter 14	<u>Detention Arrangement at San Uk Ling Holding Centre</u> (49) Review riot control manpower requirements with a view to strengthening the logistical and manpower deployments to deal with arrested persons (APs) during large-scale POEs. This review should consider whether current guidance be sufficiently clear to ensure the attainment of the dual objectives of maintaining law and order and bringing offenders to justice while respecting their rights. This review should also consider whether the Police Force need augmentation in training, manpower and technology. (50) As to manning a Temporary Holding Area (THA), allocate more manpower resources to ensure the effective and efficient discharge of the Police administrative work in handling a large number of APs at the same time. (51) Implement enhancements such as sufficient space and facilities with computerised audit trail functions soonest possible in all police stations. If a place outside a police station is used as a THA in future, then such THA should have equivalent facilities as those in police stations.

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	(52) Consider identifying less remote sites as THAs in case such need arises in future. The location should also take into account the availability of hospitals and ambulance depots within reasonable distance.